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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRUCE AARON ELLIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890657-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant BRUCE AARON ELLIS relies on his opening 
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant 
replies to the State's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ellis properly requested and preserved his lesser 
included offense argument. At trial, he requested that the court 
"submit this matter to the jury as an assault, a simple 
assault . . . ." Subsequent statements by Mr. Ellis confirmed, 
rather than negated, his prior request. 
The Information and the jury instruction focused only on 
whether Mr. Ellis used "means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury . . . ." Any evidence (the photographs or 
testimony) addressing the end result was prejudicial because of its 
potential for misleading the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT REQUESTED THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
In its brief, the State concedes, "Defendant correctly 
states that he moved the court to dismiss the aggravated assault and 
to submit the matter to the jury as a simple assault." Appellee's 
brief at 8. Thereafter, however, the State argued, "Having failed 
to request a lesser included instruction on simple assault, 
defendant is in no position to argue on appeal that the trial court 
erred in not giving such an instruction." Appellee's brief at 10. 
The resolution of this apparent contradiction requires a 
reexamination of the involved motion. See Appellant's opening brief 
at 13 n.3. After the court excused the jury, the following 
discussion took place: 
THE COURT: You can proceed, [Defense counsel]. 
[Defense counsel]: Thank you, your Honor. Your 
Honor, the court stated yesterday that I might make 
any appropriate motions today rather than yesterday 
when the state initially rested. 
Your Honor, it would be our motion to dismiss the 
aggravated assault count and to ask the court to 
submit this matter to the jury as an assault, a simple 
assault in terms of the state's evidence presented. 
(TB 14) (emphasis added). 
Hence, defense counsel made clear his request for a lesser 
included offense instruction. (TB 14). His remaining arguments in 
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support of the motion stressed repeatedly how the State had failed 
to prove the element, "likely to produce serious bodily injury." 
Cf. (R 69) (emphasis added). Simple "bodily injury," however, was 
not then an element of dispute: 
[Defense counsel]: In order to establish [a] prima 
facie case of aggravated assault I believe that the 
state is required to submit prima facie evidence that 
this injury that was suffered by Mr. Drew was likely 
to produce death or serious bodily injury. The 
evidence that has been presented by Dr. Howe in no way 
indicates that this was serious bodily injury, and in 
fact, I believe that his evidence is to the contrary. 
THE COURT: Well, the question is not whether it was 
serious bodily injury, it was whether it was likely. 
I mean, if you use someone with a gun [sic] and it 
doesn't happen to hurt them, that's still aggravated 
assault. If they shoot them with a pea shooter and it 
kills them, that's not. 
[Defense counsel]: I understand the court's point, 
and I'll address that. [The "seriousness" of the 
wound was again addressed.] 
And the argument that the defense would proffer is 
that they've not met the prima facie burden of 
providing serious bodily injury or the likelihood that 
it would. There was no evidence elicited to that 
specific point. He was not asked did this constitute 
serious bodily injury, nor did any of his answers 
elicit it, either through direct or cross-examination 
at any point ever indicate that this was in fact 
serious bodily injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't think I can take that 
from the jury. I think they could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that serious bodily injury—the deep 
scar, a deep cut, long cut, lots of tissue that was 
damaged close to a nerve—I think they could find that 
it was likely to create serious bodily injury. I 
think the injury is pretty serious, so I think under 
those circumstances I'm going to deny that motion. 
(TB 14-16). 
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The trial court thus acknowledged and denied Mr. Ellis' 
motion. Nevertheless, as stated previously, "Even if the jury 
should have been able to consider the aggravated assault charge, the 
court should not have refused 'to submit this matter to the jury as 
an assault, a simple assault in terms of the state's evidence 
presented. The evidence provided the jury with a reasonable basis 
for Ellis' simple assault theory." Appellant's opening brief at 9 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Since Mr. Ellis' motion had already been denied, his 
subsequent use of the word "We've" reflected only a past intention 
and his deference to the trial court's ruling. His present 
intention, evidenced by the term, "we're," did not negate his past 
motion; 
THE COURT: . . . Anything further, [Defense counsel]? 
[Defense counsel]: No, your Honor. I suppose I would 
need to, for purposes of my record, make a motion for 
a directive verdict on forwarding the same theories, 
your Honor, that this court should direct a verdict of 
no more than—well, a verdict of not guilty. We've 
not—we're not offering a lesser included offense, so 
I believe that the court should find that a jury 
cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the state 
has proved its case, and should direct a verdict of 
not guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay, that motion is on the record, and 
for the record it will be denied. 
(TB 16); see also Appellant's opening brief at 13 n.3. 
Although the State emphasized selected portions of the 
above exchange, Appellee's brief at 9, it offered no explanation for 
the motion already submitted and denied by the trial court. Indeed, 
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for the State to prevail * must ignore 
l 11 , K M in' prior statement: "Your Honor .. ^ oui; UMJ1 I In 
dismiss the agginVn! I-I( asfiam 11 count -* to ask the court to submit 
this matter .. > : * assaux assault in terms of 
tin* si; ;it",if"" * s evidence presented. TB 14). 
Moreover, he trial court have had ' 
overlook the motion, itself, (TB 14), the » -i ii nive had 
t i ' • i. I" M l i s ' subsequent reference to the motion: '"his i i- i 
case where, as we discuss* had a lesser included 
offense been submitted, might well have been aid 
lu i i I erdict oi simple assault (TB 45 Appellant's 
opening brief : J 1, 
Neither scenerio occurred. When Ellis refex 
tu tliei ii i i • i ussi-ni concerning the inclusion "I esser 
included offense, the court did n * H\ « |ue^t ! hi n; rather, the 
ii it acknowledged candidly the possibility of a "simple assault" 
jury verdi-L" > "•• of this case. See ' 4r' ; 
Appellant's opening briei usage 
mclear the request : his motion, (TB 1 6 ) ; Appellee's briei: 
at. 9, then his subsegu resolved any ambiguity 
and confirmed his prior statements. should have 
U<ei i» st m e t e d on the lesser included offense or simple assault. 
The State argue court "truly had no idea 
that -i request for a lesser included instructor esented 
.April I I ' i'" • brief at 10. Again, the State's argument has 
merit only if Mr. Ellis' prior motion was ignored, a position not 
taken by Appellant.1 
The State additionally argues that the trial court's denial 
of Ellis' motion was a response "only to his motion to dismiss the 
aggravated assault count." Appellee's brief at 9. In essence, the 
State urges, because the trial court did not specifically address 
Mr. Ellis' motion "to submit this matter to the jury as an assault, 
a simple assault in terms of the state's evidence presented[,]" 
(TB 14), he did not preserve his issue for appeal. The trial 
court's general denial of Ellis' two pronged motion did not negate 
the existence of his request for the lesser included offense. 
Mr. Ellis properly preserved and presented his theory of the case. 
POINT II 
THE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PREJUDICIAL BECAUSE THEY 
MISDIRECTED THE JURY'S ATTENTION WITH CONSIDERATIONS 
NOT RELEVANT TO ITS VERDICT 
In its brief, the State acknowledges that "the jury was 
instructed under [Utah Code Ann. §] 76-5-103(1)(b) only." 
Appellee's brief at 2. Thus, "[t]he photographs and all testimony 
on anything other than the throwing motion of the defendant were 
1
 When the trial court denied Mr. Ellis' motion it made a 
mistake, period. The court did not knowingly ignore Ellis' motion, 
nor did it knowingly refuse "to instruct on simple assault when it 
believed it appropriate." Appellee's brief at 10. To suggest "bad 
faith" or anything other than a legal error, as the State has done, 
is to read far too much into the arguments stated simply by 
Appellant. 
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i irrelevant to th^ f . . . . - - - • . information and 
the jury i nstruction. (R ; u.v - r 
opej accompanying text. Most of the State's 
arguments, however, centered er Ulld A 1 O u t 
"likely to produce" element of the instruction. 
hotographs were inadmissible because they 
were not probative <•- essential facts. They depict.eel PIII", In1 
resulting wound; they conveyed nothing about Bruce Ellis' "off 
handed" I 11 r ov, i kelihood.if Though cited 
previously, the trial court's statement JI IIU« inHjaiin dt-sii '.MI 
aildii i.-ri.il emphasis: 
the question is not whether it was serious bodily 
injury, it was whether it was likely, 1 mean, if 
[someone uses] a gun and it doesn't happen to hurt 
them that's still aggravated assault. If they shoot 
them with a pea shooter and it kills them, that's net, 
(TB 15). 
Similarly, since r . Howe had not witnessed 1 he 
nothing about the "off handed" throw. 
Just as death is not probative * ftftson using a 
pea shooter, too was his testimony (and photographs) not 
browing motion. The probative evidence was not 
dispute. 
The State and Mr. Ellis both agreed that he threw the glass 
with li I,1, wib-jnj hand ** <• P1lee's brief at (-; Appellant's opening 
brief at 10. Since \'.- victim, himself, also 11 :km>w 11 nl• ( ' I 
threw it "off handed," (TA 107), Ellis' awkward actions may 
not have constituted "such means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury . . . ." (R 69).2 If the doctor had 
testified that an "off handed" throw by a person who "just had 
surgery on [his other] arm[,]" (TA 143), lacked balance and 
coordination, that testimony may have been proper. Anything else 
focused improperly on the end result. 
Consequently, while the State may have been correct in 
quoting the foregoing standard, its emphasis was misplaced. The 
proper focus is underscored as follows: 
We have frequently stated and applied the rule that 
color photographs of the body of the victim - even 
photographs that are gruesome - are not inadmissible 
if they are probative of essential facts, even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added); 
Appellee's brief at 14. By negative implication, photographs should 
be inadmissible if they are not probative of essential facts. 
The harmless error analysis is inapplicable here although 
Mr. Ellis acknowledges that it may have applied under different 
circumstances. See Appellant's opening brief at 23. Because no 
such circumstances exist in the case at bar, a new trial is 
warranted. 
2
 Mr. Ellis' motion for a directed verdict on the 




Based on the foregoing, Bruce Ellis respectfully requests 
that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to the trial 
court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this SO day of February, 1990. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RON) S. FtklNO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RON S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^O day of February, 1990. 
RON\S. FUJINO 
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